Taxation - Federal Income Tax - Treatment of Gains from Commodity Futures Transactions of Manufacturing Consumer by Flanagin, Neil, S.Ed.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 54 Issue 5 
1956 
Taxation - Federal Income Tax - Treatment of Gains from 
Commodity Futures Transactions of Manufacturing Consumer 
Neil Flanagin S.Ed. 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Commercial Law Commons, Securities Law Commons, Taxation-Federal Commons, and 
the Tax Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Neil Flanagin S.Ed., Taxation - Federal Income Tax - Treatment of Gains from Commodity Futures 
Transactions of Manufacturing Consumer, 54 MICH. L. REV. 719 (1956). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol54/iss5/18 
 
This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law 
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
1956] RECENT DECISIONS 719 
TAXATION-FEDERAL INCOME TAX-TREATMENT OF GAINS FROM COM-
MODITY FUTURES TRANSACTIONS OF MANUFACTURING CONSUMER-Taxpayer, 
a manufacturer of products made from corn, purchased and sold corn fu. 
tures contracts as a part of its regular buying program in order to protect 
itself against a possible shortage of raw materials. Taxpayer contended that 
the gains realized on these transactions should receive capital asset treat-
ment. The Tax Court and the court of appeals held that the gains consti-
tuted ordinary income.1 On appeal, held, affirmed. The transactions, though 
not true hedges, were entered into for business purposes and as an integral 
part of taxpayer's operations. Consequently, they should be treated the 
1 Com Products Refining Co., 16 T.C. 315 (1953), 20 T.C. 503 (1953), affd. (2d Cir. 
1954) 215 F. (2d) 513. 
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same as hedges, and the gains from the transactions taxed as ordinary in-
come. Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 76 S. Ct. 
20 (1955). 
The problem presented by the principal case is common to consumers 
of commodities traded on futures markets, as it is customary for them to 
buy and sell futures contracts in the commodities in which they deal. The 
most frequent practice of this type is hedging, a form of insurance against 
price fluctuations secured by purchasing futures contracts, and then clos-
ing them out if the purchaser's requirements can be met by dealing in the 
cash market, or taking delivery if the cash market price goes up.2 The re-
verse process is often used by producers of commodities.3 The theory· of 
hedging rests on the premise that the cash and futures prices roughly paral-
lel each other, so that a loss in one will be offset by a gain in the other, if a 
balanced position is maintained between them. The purpose of the trans-
actions in the principal case was not to insure against unfavorable price 
fluctuations in raw materials, but to insure against fluctuations in the 
amount of available raw materials, and to secure an alternative to the ex-
pense of obtaining greater storage capacity. Generally, the law has distin-
guished hedging from speculative transactions or capital investments.'1 
However, hedging and related transactions have had a varied history under 
the federal income tax. Since 1934 hedging transactions have come within 
the definition of capital asset transactions.5 They also came within the lan-
guage of the short sales provision of the code.6 However, shortly after 
1934, the Treasury recognized that true hedges should be excluded from 
the capital 'asset provisions, and that gains from these transactions should 
be treated as ordinary income and losses deductible in full as business ex-
penses.7 To the extent that futures gains compensate for losses in cash 
transactions in the same commodities, there is no income, but merely com-
pensation for the losses.8 The first judicial acceptance of this exception 
2 See Patterson, "Hedging and Wagering on Produce Exchanges," 40 YALE L. J. 84!! 
(19!!1); 51 YALE L. J. 505 (1942). 
3 Kenneth S. Battelle, 47 B.T.A. ll7 (1942). 
4 Brown v. Thom, 260 U.S. lll1, lll9, 4!! S.Ct. 36 (1922); United States v. New York 
Coffee and Sugar Exchange, 263 U.S. 6ll, 44 S.Ct. 225 (1924). The Court in the latter case 
distinguished between hedges, legitimate capital investments, and speculation, defining 
hedges as transactions entered into by businessmen " •.. to insure themselves against loss 
by unfavorable changes in price at the time of actual delivery of what they have to sell 
or buy in their business .... " 26!! U.S. 6ll at 619. 
5 Before 19!!4 capital assets were defined, inter alia, as property held for at least t,vo 
yeaI"S. Revenue Act of 19!!2, 47 Stat. L. 192, §IOI (c) (8). No futures contract is ever held 
that long. The· two-year requirement was discarded in 1934. Revenue Act of 19!!4, 48 
Stat. L. 714, §ll7 (b), reenacted in I.R.C. (1939), §ll7 (a) (1). See Rich and Rippe, "Tax 
Aspects of Commodity Futures Transactions With a Business Purpose," 2 TAX L. REv. 541 
(1947). Commodity futures contracts are not property held primarily for sale to cus-
tomers or includible in taxpayer's inventory within the language of the capital asset defi-
nition of the code. O. L. Burnett, 40 B.T.A. 605 (19!!9). 
6 Commissioner v. Banfield, (9th Cir. 1941) 122 F. (2d) 1017. 
7 G.C.M. 17322, XV-2 Cum. Bui. 151 (19!!6). This applies only to imperfect hedges; in 
theoretically perfect hedg~ the losses in one equal the gains in the other. 
8 G.C.M. 18ll8ll, 19!17-2 Cum. Bui. 244; I.T. 31!!7, 19!17-2 Cum. Bui. 164. 
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was in Ben Grote9 where the Board of Tax Appeals held that losses from 
hedging transactions were deductible in full and nqt subject to the limita-
tion on capital loss deductions.10 While the courts gave a relatively broad 
interpretation to the term "hedge,"11 they were slow to expand the excep-
tion to embrace any similar transactions, such as insuring against a potential 
shortage of raw· materials.12 It has been said that each of these cases must 
turn on its particular facts,13 and the courts have been quick to determine 
whether there is any purpose to insure against unfavorable price fluctua-
tions,14 or whether the facts of the case indicate that the futures contracts 
actually operate as hedges.15 If a general rule can be gleaned from the cases 
prior to the principal case, it is that futures transactions entered into for 
price insurance constitute hedges and are within the exception, but that 
any other kind of business insurance purpose will not take the futures 
transaction out of the capital asset provisions.16 The Court in the principal 
case takes a much broader view by excluding from capital asset treatment 
transactions which are not technically hedges, but which were entered into 
for protection against potential adverse business conditions other than price 
fiuctuations.17 In light of the Court's decision, it appears that those earlier 
cases18 restricting non-capital asset treatment to futures transactions entered 
into for price insurance are overruled by implication. The fact that most 
of those cases dealt with the treatment of losses rather than gains, is not a 
significant distinction. To be consistent, the Supreme Court would have to 
hold that losses from such protective transactions should be treated in 
9 41 B.T .A. 247 (1940). 
10 Net losses on capital asset transactions were deductible only to the extent of 
$2,000. Revenue Act of 1934, 48 Stat. L. 715, §117 (d). Cf. I.R.C. (1954), §1211. 
11 Kenneth S. Battelle, note 3 supra; S. Steinberg &: Co., 11 P-H T.C. Mem. Dec. 1[42,592 
(1942); Stewart Silk Corp., 9 T.C. 174 (1947). An oft-quoted definition of hedging is 
found in Commissioner v. Farmers and Ginners Cotton Oil Co., (5th Cir. 1941) 120 F. (2d) 
772 at 774, cert. den. 314 U.S. 683, 62 S.Ct. 185 (1941): "A hedge is a form of price insur-
ance; it is resorted to by businessmen to avoid the risk of changes in the market price of a 
commodity. The basic principle of hedging is the maintenance of an even or balanced 
market position." 
12 Estate of Dorothy Makransky, 5 T.C. 397 at 412 (1945), affd. (3d Cir. 1946) 154 F. 
(2d) 59, holding that the purchase of wool futures to protect a clothing manufacturer 
against an anticipated shortage of raw materials were capital asset transactions. See also 
Tennessee Egg Co., 47 B.T.A. 558 (1942); Commissioner v. Covington, (5th Cir. 1941) 120 
F. (2d) 768, cert. den. 315 U.S. 822, 62 S.Ct. 912 (1942). 
13 Kenneth S. Battelle, note 3 supra, at 125. 
14 Staerker v. United States, (D.C. Tex. 1938) 23 A.F.T.R. 1284; 0. L. Burnett, note 
5 supra; W. H. Wilson, Inc., IO P-H T.C. Mem. Dec. 1[41,015 (1941); Trenton Cotton Oil 
Co. v. Commissioner, (6th Cir. 1945) 147 F. (2d) 33, reh. den. (6th Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 
208. 
15 Commissioner v. Covington, note 12 supra; W. H. Wilson, Inc., note 14 supra; 
Commissioner v. Farmers and Ginners Cotton Oil Co., note 11 supra. 
16 MONTGOMERY, FEDERAL TAXES ON CORPORATIONS 369 (1946); Rich and Rippe, "Tax 
Aspects of Commodity Futures Transactions," 2 TAX L. REv. 541 at 556 (1947). 
17 An additional basis for the Court's decision is its traditional narrow definition of 
capital asset transactions. Stratton's Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399 at 414, 
34 S.Ct. 136 (1913); Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28, 61 S.Ct. 757 (1941). 
18 See note 12 supra. 
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the same manner as insurance premiums, and be allowed a full business 
deduction. · 
Until 1954 there was no provision for hedging transactions in the 
code, but in drafting the 1954 code Congress expressly excluded these trans-
actions from the short sales provision.19 However, no mention is made of 
transactions like those of the principal case which do not come within the 
technical definition of hedges. A statutory exclusion of all futures con-
tracts entered into essentially for protection against potential adverse 
business conditions from capital asset treatment would be preferable, but 
in view of the decision in the principal case, it may not be necessary. 
Neil Flanagin, S.Ed. 
19 I.R.C. (1954), §1233 (a). See S. Rep. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d sess., p. 437 (1954); H. Rep. 
1337, 83d Cong., 2d sess., p. A278 (1954). I.R.C. (1954), §1233 (e) deals further with com-
modity futures generally. See Treas. Reg. 118, §39.117 (1)-2. 
